We propose a simple non-cooperative game model where two fragmented teams compete to increase their performance. The theoretical framework is based on the theory of conflict. We show that depending on the value of a parameter in the model, the power of the competing teams may be expressed as a function of well-known fragmentation indexes: the Herfindhal-Hirschman index, the Laakso-Taagepera index, the Best shot index and the Weakest-link index.
Introduction
There is a large body of economic literature related to measuring the performance of a team. It is often argued that team's performance depends, among other things, on team's fragmentation. The effect of fragmentation on team's performance may be of different kinds. For instance, a political coalition composed of several parties may be more or less powerful depending on the fragmentation of the coalition. The intuition is that strategic interactions among members of the same coalition may lead to free-riding and that the greater the fragmentation of the coalition, the less the participation of parties in the coalition (e.g., Padovano and Venturi, 2001 , Schalteger and Feld, 2009 , and Le Maux et al., 2011 . Likewise, the performance of sport or labor teams may also be linked to the concentration of salaries.
Two reasons can be advanced to justify this link. First, due to cohesiveness issues, wage disparities may have a negative impact on team performance. This is the fairness hypothesis raised by Akerlof and Yellen (1990) and formalized by Levine (1991) . On the other hand, Lazear and Rosen (1981) stress the positive impact of wage inequalities on workers' incentives to exert effort. In the same vein, the performance of a military alliance depends not only on the overall resources of the alliance but also on the allies' contribution structure. At the limit only the highest contribution matters, this is the best shot rule or, conversely, only the smallest contribution is of importance, this is the weakest-link rule (see for instance Hirshleifer, 1983 , Sandler and Hartley, 2001 , Dutheil de la Rochère et al., 2011 .
To the best of our knowledge, no papers propose a microeconomic foundation for the utilisation of fragmentation indexes to measure the performance of a team. This is what we do in the present paper. The theoretical framework is based on the theory of conflict in which contest is modeled thanks to contest success functions. Section 2 presents the theoretical framework. Section 3 shows that depending on the value of the cost parameter of the model, the power or performance of the team may be expressed as a function of one of these four 1 fragmentation indexes. Section 4 concludes and summarises the main contributions of the present paper. 
Theoretical framework
where π A (e A , e B ) and π B (e A , e B ) are contest success functions as in Tullock (1980) and Skaperdas (1996) .
Each team is respectively composed of n A and n B individuals. The resources of The individuals within each team are assumed to behave non-cooperatively. individual p in Team A chooses its effort level e A p so as to maximize its payoff. This payoff is defined as the difference between its benefit in terms of performance, π A , and the cost of the effort e A p /r A p , i.e., the share of individual p's resources devoted to the team production:
where λ ≥ µ and µ ∈]0, 1[, to ensure that second order conditions are met. The effort level of individual p in Team A must satisfy the following first-order conditions:
Rewriting the first-order conditions gives e A p = (r A p )
we have 
which implicitly defines the reaction function of Team B. It follows from equations (4) and (5) that
where
and α K p = r K p r K denotes the share of individual p's resources in Team K's total resources. Using equation (6) with equations (4) and (5) yields the Nash equilibrium effort levels of Team A and Team B:
The equilibrium effort of a team depends on its relative total resources and its relative fragmentation. By using equation (8) with equations (1) and (7), we directly find the equilibrium value of Team A's performance:
Team performance and fragmentation indexes
The impact of the resources distribution, i.e. how the team is fragmented, on the team's performance depends on the value of cost parameter λ . We will focus on a few values of λ leading to well-known fragmentation indexes (see Table 1 ).
If λ → ∞, the cost of efforts of individual p in Team A tends to zero because 
2 as defined by Laakso and Taagepera (1979) . The ENP index is widely used among the political scientists to measure the number of "relevant" parties in a political system and to make comparison of the political power of governments across countries (for example, Colomer, 2005) .
If λ → 1 + , the team's performance increases with the size of the biggest individual of the team in terms of resources share, α A max = max(α A 1 , . . . , α A n A ). This is known as the best shot rule in the economics of conflict literature. Only the contribution of the biggest individual matters (see Appendix A). Returning to Equation 2, since λ > 1, one can easily show that these indexes are coherent with the assumption that the marginal cost of effort is increasing.
If λ =→ 1 − , the team's performance increases with the resources of the smallest individual, α A min = min(α A 1 , . . . , α A n A ). In the economics of conflict literature this assumption is known as the weakest link rule (see Appendix B). Since λ ∈ [µ, 1[, this index is coherent with the assumption that the marginal cost of efforts is decreasing.
Conclusion
In the present paper we propose a microfounded performance measure that can be expressed as a function of well-known fragmentation indexes by giving specific values to the cost parameter of the model. Our formalism can easily be applied to issues in political economy, economics Effort of player p to win the match or of worker p to accomplish a task Probability to win the match or to accomplish a task successfully of conflict, sports economics or labor economics. As an illustration, Table 2 provides the correspondence between the theoretical variables and possible applications of the model.
The main contributions of this paper are twofold. First our model constitutes a theoretical rationale for the use of well-known fragmentation indexes in empirical studies.
These indexes are often put forward as proxies to the complexity of the decision making process when the individuals that compose a team widely vary in number and resources. We show that the use of these indexes is rooted in simple microeconomics.
Second, in our model, the effect of fragmentation on team performance depends on the value of cost parameter λ . When λ > 1, the performance of the team is an increasing function of its concentration. When λ < 1, the performance increases with fragmentation.
The present paper points out that if we know the performance of the team and the variable subject to fragmentation, we could estimate λ from the expression of π by using maximum likelihood methods. Following this approach, we propose a new way to investigate for instance the widely debated issue of the impact of the distribution of wages among players on the performance of a sports team (e.g., Depken, 2000; DeBrock et al., 2004; Jane et al., 2009; Jane, 2010; Simmons and Berri, 2011 ) .
